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Does the Attorney General have a duty
to defend her legislature’s statutes?
A comment on the Reference Re

Genetic Non-Discrimination Act
A N DRE W

F L AV E L L E

M A RT IN
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ABSTRACT
The Reference Re Genetic Non-Discrimination Act was unusual because
the Attorney General for Canada argued that federal legislation was
unconstitutional. In this comment, I explore the implications of this
choice for the role of the Attorney General and her relationship with
Parliament. I argue that the Attorney General has a duty not to defend
legislation, including legislation that began as a private member’s bill, that
she reasonably believes to be unconstitutional – and that if Parliament
wants to defend such legislation, it should do so itself instead of relying on
the Attorney General. If Parliament does not do so, the Attorney General
should support the appointment of amicus. However, where the Attorney
General advises Parliament during the legislative process that a bill is
unconstitutional, Parliament’s rejection of that advice is legally irrelevant
and not wrongful. That rejection should nonetheless prompt the Attorney
General to resign, if indeed she is the lawyer to the legislature.

Keywords: Attorney General; Legislation; Parliament; Legislatures;
Federalism

*
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INTRODUCTION

D

oes the Attorney General have a duty to defend legislation passed
by her respective legislature? For example, does the Attorney
General for Canada have a duty to defend Parliament’s
legislation? To put it another way, is it ever appropriate for the Attorney
General for Canada to concede or actively argue that federal legislation is
unconstitutional?
The Attorney General has a unique and multifaceted role, but some
facets are underdeveloped in the case law and literature. One undisputed
facet is that the Attorney General is the chief law officer of the Crown, i.e.
the government’s lawyer,1 meaning that one of her functions is to
represent the government in litigation.2 At a minimum, this function
would appear to entail a presumptive duty to defend government
legislation against legal challenges.3 There is debate in the literature,
however, over whether the Attorney General has a duty to defend all
legislation passed by her respective legislature – for example, whether the
Attorney General for Canada has a duty to defend all of Parliament’s
legislation. That literature focuses on defending challenges to legislation
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and appears to
specifically contemplate only government legislation.4 What about
constitutional challenges outside of the Charter, such as the law of
1

See e.g. Ontario v Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43 at para 5.

2

See e.g. Department of Justice Act, RSC 1985, c J-2, s 5(d) [DOJA]: “The Attorney
General of Canada… shall have the regulation and conduct of all litigation for or
against the Crown”.

3

See e.g. Debra M McAllister, “The Attorney General’s Role as Guardian of the Public
Interest in Charter Litigation” (2002) 21 Windsor YB Access Just 47 at 50-51
[McAllister]; Kent Roach, “Not Just the Government’s Lawyer: The Attorney General
as Defender of the Rule of Law” (2006) 31:2 Queen’s LJ 598 at 610-611 [Roach, “Not
Just”]; Grant Huscroft, “The Attorney General and Charter Challenge to Legislation:
Advocate or Adjudicator?” (1995) 5 NJCL 125 at 129, 143 [Huscroft, “Advocate or
Adjudicator?”]; Grant Huscroft, “Reconciling Duty and Discretion: The Attorney
General in the Charter Era” (2009) 34:2 Queen’s LJ 773 at 795-796 [Huscroft, “Duty
and Discretion”] (Huscroft is now Justice Huscroft of the Court of Appeal for
Ontario).

4

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.

222 MANITOBA LAW JOURNAL | VOLUME 43 ISSUE 2
federalism? And what about legislation that begins life as a private
member’s bill?
In this comment, I consider the implications of the Reference Re
Genetic Non-Discrimination Act for the role of the Attorney General.5 While
my focus is on the federal Attorney General and Parliament’s legislation,
the same analysis applies to the provincial Attorney General and
provincial legislation. The GNDA Reference was, in some respects, a typical
federalism reference. The Attorney General for Quebec argued that federal
legislation was ultra vires Parliament, and the matter turned on the contest
between the provincial trade and commerce power and the federal
criminal law power. What was surprising, and perhaps even unique, was
that the Attorney General for Canada also argued that the federal
legislation in question was ultra vires. Indeed, the Minister of Justice had
made the same argument to legislators during debate on the private
member’s bill that became the GNDA.
This comment is organized in three parts. In Part 1, I provide the
necessary background about the GNDA and the GNDA Reference. In Part
2, I canvass and critique the two predominant views in the literature of the
role of the Attorney General and assess their implications for the
questions I have posed. The first view, represented primarily by Grant
Huscroft, argues that the Attorney General has an absolute duty to defend
Parliament’s legislation.6 The second view, represented primarily by Kent
Roach, argues that the Attorney General should take a position on
constitutionality that is consistent with the Attorney General’s duty to see
that public affairs are conducted in accordance with the law – which will
sometimes mean conceding or even arguing against the constitutionality of
a law.7 While these views address concessions or arguments of
unconstitutionality by the Attorney General, they do so only in the
5

Genetic Non-Discrimination Act, SC 2017, c 3 [GNDA]; Reference Re: Genetic NonDiscrimination Act, 2020 SCC 17 [GNDA Reference Appeal], rev’g 2018 QCCA 2193
[GNDA Reference].

6

Huscroft, “Advocate or Adjudicator?”, supra note 3; Huscroft, “Duty and Discretion”,
supra note 3.

7

Roach, “Not Just”, supra note 3; McAllister, supra note 3. See also DOJA, supra note 2,
s 4(a): “The Minister is the official legal adviser of the Governor General and the legal
member of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada and shall … see that the
administration of public affairs is in accordance with law”.
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context of the Charter, not under federalism (or other constitutional
grounds, such as section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982). Thus, in Part 2 I
also consider the implications of these views in the context of the GNDA
Reference – a context in which legislation challenged on federalism grounds
began as a private member’s bill that the Attorney General characterized as
unconstitutional during the legislative process. Then, in Part 3 I consider
some deeper questions posed by the GNDA and the GNDA Reference for
the role of the Attorney General and her relationship with Parliament,
questions that appear to be unasked in the existing literature.

PART I: THE GENETIC NON-DISCRIMINATION ACT AND THE
REFERENCE
The GNDA has three main parts. One part, section 9, amended the
Canadian Human Rights Act to recognize “genetic characteristics”, including
“refusal of a request to undergo a genetic test or to disclose, or authorize
the disclosure of, the results of a genetic test,” as a prohibited ground of
discrimination.8 Another part, section 8, amended the Canada Labour Code
to grant employees the right to refuse a genetic test or the disclosure of the
results of such a test.9 The remainder, sections 1 to 7, prohibits
(“criminalizes”) requiring a genetic test, or the disclosure of the results of a
genetic test, as a condition of a contract or the provision of goods and
services.10 It is these seven sections that Quebec challenged in the GNDA
Reference.

Parliament
The GNDA began life as Bill S-201 in December of 2015.11 Questions
about the bill’s constitutionality were raised almost immediately in the
Senate during the first debates. The bill’s sponsor, Senator James Cowan,
acknowledged that previous iterations of the bill had raised constitutional
concerns in purporting to regulate the insurance industry, but argued that
8

GNDA, supra note 5 s 9.

9

Ibid, s 8.

10

Ibid, ss 1-7; GNDA Reference, supra note 5 at para 3.

11

An Act to Prohibit and Prevent Genetic Discrimination, S-201 (42-1), introduced 8
December 2015.
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this version was squarely within Parliament’s criminal law power.12
Opposition leader Senator Claude Carignan questioned whether the bill
intruded on the provinces’ powers over property and civil rights.13 These
questions persisted throughout the legislative process. At committee, the
evidence from three of the four constitutional law experts – including
Peter Hogg – was that the law would be constitutional.14
In late 2016, the Minister of Justice and Attorney General for Canada
publicly stated that the Government could not support bill S-201 on,
among other grounds, federalism. Invoking the Assisted Human
Reproduction Act Reference,15 she explained that “the scope of the criminal
law power should not be extended in ways that potentially undermine the
constitutional division of powers.”16 More specifically, she noted that
“[t]he regulation of contracts and the provision of goods and services are
subject matters that ordinarily fall within provincial legislative
jurisdiction”.17
On the same day, an assistant deputy minister from the Department
of Justice made some intriguing comments about how and whether the
Attorney General would defend the bill, if passed without amendment,
against a constitutional challenge. In response to a question about how
such a defence would be made, the ADM stated that the decision about
how to defend that law would be up to the Attorney General “in

12

Senate Debates, 42-1, vol 150, No 8, (27 January 2016) at 149 (Hon James Cowan)
[Cowan, 27 January 2016].

13

Senate Debates, 42-1, vol 150, No 8, (27 January 2016) at 151 (Hon Claude Carignan).

14

Professors Bruce Ryder, Peter Hogg, and Pierre Thibault testified that the law was
constitutional. Professor Hugo Cyr testified that it was unconstitutional. See Senate,
Standing Committee on Human Rights, Evidence, 42-1, (24 February 2016) at 2:562:61 (Bruce Ryder); House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human
Rights, Evidence, 42-1, No 36 (22 November 2016) at 1-2 (Bruce Ryder), 2-3 (Peter
Hogg), 3-4 (Hugo Cyr), 4-5 (Pierre Thibault).

15

2010 SCC 61.

16

House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence,
42-1, No 35 (17 November 2016), (Minister of Justice, read by Alistair MacGregor)
[on file with author].

17

Ibid.
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consultation with her cabinet colleagues.”18 One legislator explicitly
assumed that the Attorney General would indeed defend the law against
such a challenge and noted that “the Department of Justice will be in the
uncomfortable situation of appearing in court to defend a bill that it
doesn’t support”.19 The ADM did not explicitly accept the premise that
the Attorney General would defend the law.20 She nonetheless stated that
“[i]t is an important fundamental principle that a sovereign Parliament
that has enacted a law is due its day in court” and that “[i]t is thus not
unusual for the department and the Attorney General to be in a situation
of defending those laws in court.”21 However, she did not actually state
that it is the Attorney General’s responsibility to make that defence, as
opposed for example to amicus. In hindsight, it appears that that the
ADM chose her words carefully.
In a second statement in early 2017, the Minister noted that “[a]s
Minister of Justice, I have a duty to ensure that legislation complies with
the Constitution, irrespective of policy or political preferences.”22
During the legislative process, there were several suggestions that
Parliament itself had a duty to ensure its laws were constitutional. When
proposing amendments to remove what would become sections 1 to 7
from Bill S-201, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Attorney General and
Minister of Justice invoked a duty to adopt constitutional laws, and

18

House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence,
42-1, No 35 (17 November 2016) at 3 (Laurie Wright, Assistant Deputy Minister,
Department of Justice) [Wright].

19

House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence,
42-1, No 35 (17 November 2016) at 5 (Sean Casey).

20

“Certainly it is within the discretion of the minister and the Attorney General to
make her decisions and instructions to counsel with respect to moving forward”
Wright, supra note 18 at 5.

21

Ibid at 5.

22

“Government Position Regarding Bill S-201, An Act to prohibit and prevent genetic
discrimination” Statement by the Minister of Justice (undated) [on file with author].
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specifically laws that were compliant with the division of powers.23 Bruce
Ryder, who testified that the legislation was constitutional, put it most
strongly:
it is extremely important for Parliament to exercise care and not pass
unconstitutional statutes because of the costs that imposes on all of us, really. We
shouldn’t put people to the burden of litigating to challenge unconstitutional
law…. it is one of your most important responsibilities to ensure that the
legislation you vote in favour of is constitutional.24

Similarly, one senator noted that “[w]e have a duty here to ensure that
whatever we pass, for whatever motives --- and they are all good in this case
--- can meet a constitutional test.”25
While it is risky to attribute a single view to the legislature by
extrapolating from the views of individual legislators, it seems clear from
the record that legislators – and particularly Senator Cowan, who had
introduced the bill – were satisfied that Bill S-201 was constitutional and

23

House of Commons Debates, 42-1, vol 148, No 140 (14 February 2017) at 8945 (Randy
Boissonnault): “As all members of this House are aware, it is our duty as
parliamentarians to ensure that we fundamentally respect the Constitution before
passing any laws. Part of that duty means that we must remain vigilant of the
constitutional division of powers between the federal Parliament and our provincial
counterparts”.

24

Senate, Standing Committee on Human Rights, Evidence, 42-1, (24 February 2016) at
2:69 (Bruce Ryder).

25

Senate Debates, 42-1, vol 150, No 27 (14 April 2016) at 477 (Sen A Raynell
Andreychuk).
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that they had a reasonable basis for doing so.26 Indeed, legislators noted
that the Attorney General’s view was contrary to the majority of evidence
at both committees,27 with one legislator voicing confusion: “How could it
[the government] have reached such a different conclusion than those of
our colleagues on the justice committee?”28 The same legislator suggested
that by passing the bill, “[t]he Senate has deemed, indeed, that we do have
the federal power to enact this sort of legislation to ensure that Canadians
are protected.”29
Despite the Attorney General’s opposition to the bill, it passed both
the Senate and the House of Commons, receiving royal assent to become
the GNDA.

26

See e.g. Cowan, 27 January 2016, supra note 12 at 151: “I’m satisfied that those
provisions are constitutional and that they are a valid exercise of the federal criminal
power…. I believe, based upon the advice that I’ve received, that this is entirely
appropriate…. I am satisfied, based upon the advice that I’ve received, that it is within
our power to legislate in this way”; Senate, Standing Committee on Human Rights,
Evidence, 42-1, (17 February 2016) at 2:19 (Sen James Cowan): “I’m not saying there
would not be a challenge. It’s a free country and anybody can challenge anything they
want. But I’m satisfied that this is a legitimate exercise of the power that we have as
federal parliamentarians to legislate in this area”; Senate Debates, 42-1, vol 150, No 22
(22 March 2016) at 382 (Sen James Cowan): “I am quite confident that the bill, if
challenged, will be upheld as a valid exercise of the federal criminal law power.”;
House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence,
42-1, No 34 (15 November 2016) at 3 (Sen James Cowan): “I take issues of
constitutionality very seriously. I’m satisfied, based upon discussions I’ve had with
eminent constitutional authorities in this country, as well as our own Senate Law Clerk
and Parliamentary Counsel, that Bill S-201, including the proposed genetic nondiscrimination act, is constitutional as a valid exercise of the federal criminal law
power and it, therefore, falls well within the legislative authority of our Parliament”
[Emphasis added].

27

House of Commons Debates, 42-1, vol 148, No 149 (7 March 2017) at 9501 (Don
Davies). See also House of Commons Debates, 42-1, vol 148, No 140 (14 February 2017)
at 8952 (Anthony Housefather): “When there is a dispute or debate about
constitutionality related to criminal law in Canada, I would prefer to cite Peter Hogg
over anyone else”.

28

House of Commons Debates, 42-1, vol 148, No 140 (14 February 2017) at 8949 (Robert
Oliphant).

29

House of Commons Debates, 42-1, vol 148, No 77 (20 September 2016) at 4887 (Robert
Oliphant).
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Quebec Court of Appeal
In the GNDA Reference, a five-judge panel of the Quebec Court of
Appeal unanimously held – in relatively brief reasons – that the challenged
core of the GNDA, sections 1 to 7, was ultra vires Parliament’s jurisdiction
over criminal law.
Given that the Attorney General for Canada intended not to defend
the constitutionality of the GNDA, Hesler CJQ appointed amicus “afin
que la Cour bénéficie d'un éclairage complet sur les questions et
arguments soulevés dans ce dossier”.30 The Attorney General for Canada
supported the appointment of amicus on the basis that no participating
Attorney General intended to argue for the constitutionality of the Act.31
The panel emphasized that “[d]espite the title of the Act, the pith and
substance of its sections 1 to 7 is not to prohibit genetic discrimination” –
that is the role of section 9 alone.32 Instead, sections 1 to 7 “encourage the
use of genetic tests in order to improve the health of Canadians by
supressing the fear of some that this information could eventually serve
discriminatory purposes in the entering of agreements of in the provision
of goods and services, particularly insurance and employment contracts.”33
In the view of the panel, this is not a criminal law object, and specifically
the Act is not aimed at a “real public health evil” like tobacco. 34
Particularly noteworthy for my purposes is the panel’s choice to also
“emphasiz[e] that Parliament adopted sections 1 to 7 of the Act against the
advice of the Minister of Justice of Canada and notwithstanding the

30

Letter from Hon Nicole Duval Hesler, Chief Justice of Quebec, to counsel (6 February
2018) [on file with author]. Unofficial translation: “so that the Court has a full
explanation of the issues and arguments raised in this case”.

31

Letter from Alexander Pless to Hon Nicole Duval Hesler, Chief Justice of Quebec (12
December 2017) [on file with author]: “Vu cette situation particulière, aucun
Procureur General participant au Renvoi ne présentera les arguments en faveur de la
constitutionalité de la Loi”.

32

GNDA Reference, supra note 5 at para 10.

33

Ibid at para 11.

34

Ibid at para 24.
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opinion of her department concluding that the provisions were
unconstitutional”.35

Supreme Court of Canada
On the appeal of the GNDA Reference to the Supreme Court of
Canada, Wagner CJC likewise appointed amicus.36 Unlike at the Court of
Appeal, where the assigned role of amicus had been to argue that the
GNDA was constitutional, the Supreme Court of Canada “directs you
[amicus] to exercise your independent judgment in responding to the legal
issues raised by the appellant.”37 As at the Court of Appeal, the Attorney
General for Canada supported the appointment of amicus.38

In Sum: Unusual History and Circumstances
Thus, the GNDA Reference is unusual, if not unique, as a federalism
challenge in which the Attorney General for Canada argued against the
constitutionality of federal legislation. Moreover, the GNDA was unusual
because it was a private member’s bill passed by Parliament against the
constitutional advice of the Attorney General.

PART II: THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: THE TWO
PREDOMINANT VIEWS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Given their unusual history and circumstances, the GNDA and the
GNDA Reference provide some unique insights into the role of the
Attorney General. In this Part, I consider and critique the two
predominant views in the literature about the responsibilities of the
Attorney General when the constitutionality of legislation is challenged.
As these views focus on Charter challenges, I particularly consider their

35

Ibid at para 13. In the GNDA Reference Appeal, supra note 5 at para 161, Kasirer J,
dissenting, likewise noted that “[s]ections 1 to 7 were enacted against the advice of the
then federal Minister of Justice”.

36

Order (3 July 2019), Wagner CJC [on file with author].

37

Letter from Roger Bilodeau QC, Registrar to Douglas Mitchell (5 July 2019) [on file
with author]. See also GNDA Reference Appeal, supra note 5 at para 19.

38

Letter from Alexander Pless to Roger Bilodeau QC, Registrar (23 April 2019) [on file
with author].
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implications for legislation challenged on federalism grounds as well as for
legislation that began life as a private member’s bill.

Grant Huscroft’s Near-Absolute View: A Duty to the
Legislature
In what I characterize as a near-absolute view, Grant Huscroft argues
that the Attorney General must defend laws passed by the corresponding
legislature against Charter challenges.39 Thus the Attorney General for
Canada must defend all federal laws, just as each provincial Attorney
General must defend that province’s laws. This duty not only prevents the
federal Attorney General from arguing that a federal law is
unconstitutional, and from conceding that such a law is unconstitutional,
but even requires her to appeal from any court decision holding such
legislation unconstitutional.40
Huscroft anchors his view not in the proposition that the Attorney
General has a duty to the executive as its lawyer, but instead in the
proposition that the Attorney General has a “constitutional duty to the
legislative branch”.41 It is on this basis that he argues the Attorney General
has must defend not just the legislation of the government of the day, but
also the legislation of past governments.42 Indeed, Huscroft argues that the
Attorney General must defend laws “regardless of their personal views or
the views of their governments.”43 At least in the Charter context, this
“requires the Attorney General to put duty to the law, and to the
legislature more broadly, ahead of the government’s interests and thus
serves as an important check on executive power.”44 To do otherwise, even
where the Attorney General had advised that the legislation would be
unconstitutional, would violate “the right of the legislative branch to act in
39

Huscroft, “Advocate or Adjudicator?”, supra note 3 at 143.

40

Ibid at 155: “Even the election not to appeal may be viewed as a concession, insofar as
it accepts the decision of a lower court.”; See also Huscroft, “Duty and Discretion”,
supra note 3 at 803: “A decision not to appeal is as much a concession of
unconstitutionality as a decision not to defend legislation at trial”.

41

Huscroft, “Advocate or Adjudicator?”, supra note 3 at 143.

42

Ibid at 143.

43

Ibid at 161; See also Huscroft, “Duty and Discretion”, supra note 3 at 804.

44

Huscroft, “Duty and Discretion”, supra note 3 at 804-05.
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accordance with its own view of the Charter”.45 Under Huscroft’s view, the
Attorney General by conceding or arguing unconstitutionality – or even by
declining to appeal such a ruling – is usurping and indeed “undermin[ing]
the role of the Legislature and the democratic process.”46
Huscroft makes no meaningful exception for legislation that is clearly
unconstitutional: “there is constitutional value in the defence of
legislation regardless of how obviously unconstitutional the legislation may
seem, for it ensures that the determination as to constitutionality is made
by the court on the basis of argument, rather than by the Attorney General
on the basis of legal opinion.”47 While he recognizes a possible exception
allowing a concession of unconstitutionality where there is “clear and
compelling Supreme Court authority”, he nonetheless also states that “it is
difficult to imagine legislation so obviously unconstitutional that no
arguments can be made in support of its constitutionality.”48
Huscroft also cautions that the Attorney General might seek to
concede or argue unconstitutionality not because of a genuine belief that
legislation is unconstitutional but because it is a politically expedient
alternative to a controversial amendment or repeal.49 This point may be
Huscroft’s most valuable contribution, and I return to it below.
I note here that, while Huscroft characterizes the duty as being one to
the legislature, he also emphasizes the problems that a failure to defend
the law poses for the court.50 However, instead of arguing that the duty to
defend legislation may be a duty owed to the court as well as to the
legislature, he merely notes that this “valuable assistance to the courts in
the performance of their constitutional duty” is an additional benefit of
his approach.51

45

Huscroft, “Advocate or Adjudicator?”, supra note 3 at 142.

46

Ibid at 161; See also 158-59.

47

Ibid at 162.

48

Huscroft, “Duty and Discretion”, supra note 3 at 810.

49

Ibid at 809-810 (where the government “may not have the votes required, as in a
minority government situation, or they may be unwilling or unable to expend the
political capital necessary to repeal or amend, even where they enjoy a majority in
Parliament”).

50

See e.g. Huscroft, “Advocate or Adjudicator?”, supra note 3 at 156-57.

51

Ibid at 162.
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The strength of Huscroft’s view, and its applicability to legislation that
originated as a private member’s bill, turns on whether or not he is correct
in his premise that the Attorney General is “the legislature’s lawyer” for
the purposes of litigation.52 The Federal Court of Appeal in Schmidt v
Canada (Attorney General) recently rejected this premise in concluding that
“[n]either the Minister of Justice nor the Attorney General of Canada are
legal advisors to Parliament.”53 In doing so, the Court emphasized the
impact of the separation of powers on the role of the Attorney General:
To each his own obligation: the Executive governs and introduces bills to
Parliament; Parliament examines and debates government bills and, if they are
acceptable to Parliament, enacts them into law; the Judiciary, following litigation
or a reference, determines whether or not legislation is compliant with
guaranteed rights. Each branch of our democratic system is responsible for its
respective role and should not count on the others to assume its
responsibilities.54

I have argued elsewhere that this holding was incorrect, and even contrary
to the reasons of the Supreme Court of Canada in Krieger v Law Society of
Alberta,55 insofar as the Attorney General has a long-recognized duty to
advise the legislature about the meaning and impact of bills. 56 In my view,
Huscroft is not incorrect in stating that “the Attorney General’s duties as
Chief Law Officer of the Crown extend beyond the government to the
legislature as a whole”.57 However, there is little indication – beyond
52

Ibid at 128; McAllister, supra note 3 at 90 describes Huscroft’s argument as being that
“Parliament needs a lawyer and the Attorney General must stand up for the
government”.

53

Schmidt v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 55 at para 82, leave to appeal to SCC
refused, 38179 (4 April 2019), aff’g 2016 FC 269 [Schmidt FC].

54

Ibid at para 81, quoting with approval from Schmidt FC at paras 277-78.

55

Krieger v Law Society of Alberta, 2002 SCC 65.

56

Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Attorney General’s Forgotten Role as Legal Advisor to
the Legislature: A Comment on Schmidt v Canada (Attorney General)” (2019) 52:1 UBC
L Rev 201 at 217. But for a zealous rejection of my analysis, see Steven Chaplin, “The
Attorney General Is Not the Legislature’s Legal Advisor” (2020) 14 JPPL 189; and for
my reply see Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Attorney General Is the Legislature’s Legal
Advisor (Though Not Its Only Legal Advisor), Although That Role Is Admittedly
Problematic and Should Probably Be Abolished: A Response to Steven Chaplin”
(2020) 14:3 JPPL 62.

57

Huscroft, “Advocate or Adjudicator?”, supra note 3 at 128.
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Huscroft’s bare assertion – that this limited role as the legislature’s lawyer
includes a duty to defend the legislature’s legislation in court. Moreover,
Schmidt remains law, for better or worse.
Huscroft is nonetheless in good company with this assertion that the
Attorney General is Parliament’s lawyer, as no less than Lamer CJ made it
while hearing the appeal in Miron v Trudel: “I for one question whether it
is possible for an Attorney General to make a concession that the House
violated the Charter. I would not want to be a member of that House and
see my lawyer make that concession.”58 However, this assertion is
unsupported in the case law and literature. By parallel reasoning to that in
Schmidt, if the legislature wants to defend its legislation in court, it should
retain its own counsel to do so instead of relying on the Attorney General.
Note, however, that while Huscroft speaks of a duty to the legislature,
and I follow his use of language, the legislature itself cannot instruct
counsel to defend legislation. Instead, it would be the legislative assembly,
presumably acting through the Speaker, that would do so. At the federal
level, this raises the possibility that the House of Commons and the
Senate, through their respective Speakers, could retain separate counsel
and indeed might take different positions on the constitutionality of
challenged legislation.

Federalism, Private Member’s Bills, and the GNDA

Reference
Do Huscroft’s arguments about the duty of the Attorney General
where legislation is challenged on Charter grounds apply when legislation
is challenged instead on federalism grounds? Huscroft himself paints a
rosy and uncomplicated picture of the Attorney General’s role pre-Charter:
Prior to the Charter, the role played by Attorneys General in constitutional
litigation was largely uncontroversial, for constitutional litigation rarely raised the
sort of political concerns which now routinely arise. Federalism was the stuff of
constitutional law…. The role of Attorneys General was to advance the selfinterest of their respective governments, and this was done without apology. Indeed,
the division of power… was an issue on which the political parties in the relevant
jurisdiction could often agree.59
58

Ibid at 160-161 [emphasis added], quoting from The Law Times (15-21 November
1993) 18; Miron v Trudel, [1995] 2 SCR 418, 124 DLR (4th) 693.

59
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Nonetheless, there is no apparent reason why the duty would apply
differently in federalism challenges than in Charter challenges. Indeed,
arguably a concession or argument of unconstitutionality on federalism
grounds restrains Parliament more than a concession or argument of
unconstitutionality on Charter grounds. After a law is struck down on
Charter grounds, Parliament typically retains the right to respond by
invoking the override in section 33. No such affirmative response is
possible where a law is struck down on federalism grounds.
While Huscroft does not specifically consider laws that began life as
private members’ bills,60 his concept of a constitutional duty to the
legislature would appear to not distinguish between those laws and laws
proposed by the government.
Under Huscroft’s view, the Attorney General had a duty to defend the
GNDA in the GNDA Reference and breached that duty. That the GNDA
was challenged on federalism grounds, and that it began life as a private
member’s bill, have no impact on that duty or its breach.
Recall that the Attorney General had advised the House of Commons,
during the legislative process, that bill S-201 was unconstitutional on
federalism grounds. Indeed, in doing so, the Attorney General cited her
duty “to ensure that legislation complies with the Constitution,
irrespective of policy or political preferences.”61 On Huscroft’s view, it
would appear that this advice would not affect the duty of the Attorney
General to defend the legislation in court. Indeed, this is really a
traditional lawyer model under which there is no inconsistency: the
lawyer, in her advisory role, provides a legal opinion on the client’s
preferred course of action, and then when the client proceeds despite that
advice, the lawyer in her adversarial role provides the best possible defence
of the client’s chosen course. The major difference in this particular
situation is that the advice was made public.
Huscroft’s view is premised on the role of the Attorney General as
lawyer to the legislature. That premise and thus Huscroft’s view lack legal
support, particularly after Schmidt. A different and more viable nearabsolute view would be that the Attorney General has a duty to defend
government legislation because of her duty to the government, regardless
60
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of her view as to its constitutionality. The continuing nature of the Crown
means such a duty would apply not only to legislation of the government
of the day, but also the legislation of previous governments. Under this
view, the Attorney General has no duty to defend legislation that began as
a private member’s bill, such as the GNDA.

Kent Roach and Debra McAllister’s Nuanced View: A Duty
to the Rule of Law or the Public Interest (Or Both)
I turn now to the more nuanced view – a view that, in Huscroft’s
words, “denie[s] the existence of any duty to defend the actions of the
Legislature.”62 Under this view, supported by commentators such as Kent
Roach and Debra McAllister, the Attorney General is the government’s
lawyer but “not just the government’s lawyer”.63 She should defend
challenged legislation only insofar as that defense is consistent with her
duty to the public interest and the rule of law, i.e. her duty to see that laws
are lawful and that the supreme law of the Constitution is upheld.64
(Whereas Roach characterizes the duty as one to the rule of law,
McAllister characterizes it as one to the public interest.65) This duty will
not only allow, but require, the Attorney General to argue or concede the
unconstitutionality of some legislation.66 Roach is explicit that this
decision is for the Attorney General herself to make, as opposed to
Cabinet instructing the Attorney General: “In all cases, the Attorney
62
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General should independently, albeit after consulting his or her Cabinet
colleagues, determine what legal stance in Charter litigation is consistent
with the rule of law and the public interest.”67 Indeed, Roach argues that
Cabinet cannot instruct the Attorney General to defend a law that she
considers unconstitutional, as such an approach “produces a danger of
inadequate respect for the rule of law that in Canada imposes special
constitutional obligations on governments.”68 Recall here the ADM’s
statement at committee that if the GNDA were challenged, the Attorney
General for Canada would make the decision “in consultation with”
Cabinet – rejecting any suggestion that the ultimate decision was for
Cabinet to make.69
Roach connects his approach squarely to “respect[ing] the substantive
content of the rule of law as represented by the supreme law of the
Constitution”.70 Moreover, in his view, “[t]he Attorney General should not
impose burdens on citizens by defending laws that are clearly
unconstitutional.”71 Justice Ian Binnie, writing extrajudicially, has similarly
noted that a concession of unconstitutionality can be “motivated by a
determination that the province must not only respect, but be seen to
respect, its constitutional obligations.”72 Roach responds to Huscroft’s
“democratic objection” by arguing that an Attorney General who concedes
or argues unconstitutionality must attempt to convince the legislature to
amend or repeal the law.73 (Graeme Mitchell, in contrast, argues that
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where the Attorney General cannot commit to doing so, she should
instruct counsel to argue both sides of the constitutional question.74)
For Roach and McAllister, the problems that the Attorney General’s
concession or argument of unconstitutionality poses for a court’s
deliberations can be cured by appointing amicus.75 However, Huscroft
“doubt[s] that advocacy from private parties is a substitute for submissions
from the Attorney General, and wonder[s] why it should be considered
appropriate for the burden of defending legislation to fall on private
parties or court-appointed amicus”.76 Likewise, Mitchell argues that amicus
cannot adequately replace the Attorney General, who “brings a unique
perspective to the in-court debate, one that cannot be advanced by a
private litigant, public interest intervener or amicus curiae.”77 Moreover, it
is unclear what access amicus should or would have to relevant
confidential government information.78

Federalism, Private Member’s Bills, and the GNDA

Reference
Do Roach and McAllister’s arguments about the duty of the Attorney
General apply when Parliament’s legislation is challenged not on Charter
grounds but federalism ones? Like Huscroft, McAllister paints a rosy and
uncomplicated picture of life for the Attorney General pre-Charter: “Before
the Charter, there was little reason for the Attorney General to make
concessions in most cases. Constitutional litigation focused on whether
74
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the federal or provincial government had jurisdiction to pass a law.” 79
Similarly, Lori Sterling & Heather MacKay seem to suggest that conceding
or arguing unconstitutionality was not necessary prior to the Charter.80
Nonetheless,
unconstitutionality
on
federalism
grounds
is
unconstitutionality and is as problematic for the rule of law as
unconstitutionality under the Charter.
Roach and McAllister do not explicitly address the implications of
their view for legislation that began life as a private member’s bill. That is,
they are not explicit about whether their starting point is a duty to the
legislature or a duty to the government. On the one hand, it could follow
from the role of the Attorney General as the lawyer to the executive that
she does not have a presumptive duty to defend such legislation in the
same way as she does government legislation. On the other hand, a duty to
the rule of law suggests she should defend any legislation insofar as she
considers it to be constitutional. That is, a duty to the rule of law or to the
public interest would seem to apply whether the challenged legislation
originated as a government bill or as a private member’s bill.
Under the Roach and McAllister view, it was completely appropriate
for the Attorney General for Canada to argue against the GNDA,
legislation that she had previously advised was unconstitutional. Indeed,
the advice given to the legislature should, presuming no relevant facts or
law had changed in the interim, be the position taken in litigation. Recall,
moreover, Wilson-Raybould’s emphasis in her second statement about the
constitutionality of the GNDA that “[a]s Minister of Justice, I have a duty
to ensure that legislation complies with the Constitution, irrespective of
policy or political preferences.”

On Balance: The Role of the Attorney General
Neither Huscroft nor Roach’s view would appear to change where a
law is challenged under federalism grounds instead of Charter grounds, or
where a law began life as a private member’s bill instead of a government
79
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bill. On balance, the choice between Huscroft and Roach turns on the
role of the Attorney General. Huscroft’s view – a near-absolute duty to
defend legislation, which would seemingly apply to legislation challenged
on federalism grounds and to legislation that originated as a private
member’s bill – relies on a disputed characterization of the Attorney
General as a lawyer to the legislature. Even if the Attorney General is a
lawyer to Parliament in advising on bills during the legislative process, she
ceases to perform this role once legislation is passed. In contrast, Roach’s
view is centred on the duty of the Attorney General to uphold the rule of
law, a duty clearly recognized and confirmed in legislation. For this reason,
Roach’s view is stronger.
I conclude that the Attorney General for Canada does not have an
overriding duty to defend legislation passed by Parliament, whether
government legislation or legislation that began life as a private member’s
bill and whether the challenge is on Charter grounds or federalism
grounds. The difference is that a government bill is unlikely to even be
introduced if the Attorney General advises that it would be
unconstitutional. Indeed, where legislation was passed in the face of the
Attorney General’s position that it would be unconstitutional, and where
the legal landscape has not changed, the Attorney General should take
that same position in litigation. At the same time, Huscroft’s caution –
that the Attorney General might be tempted to concede or argue
unconstitutionality not because of a genuine belief that legislation is
unconstitutional but because it is a politically expedient alternative to a
controversial amendment or repeal – is an important one.81 The Attorney
General’s solemn responsibility to the rule of law should not be abused or
stretched for political expediency, as surely Roach would agree. As in other
matters,82 the best protection against such abuse is the personal integrity of
the Attorney General.
If Parliament – in this context, more specifically the House or the
Senate, or both – seeks to defend legislation such as the GNDA, it should
rely on its own counsel, not the Attorney General, to do so. In contrast to
the Attorney General, counsel retained by the legislative assembly do not
have a special duty to the rule of law and are free to argue that legislation
81
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is constitutional – even if that legislation is unquestionably not
constitutional. If the House and Senate decline to do so, the Court should
appoint amicus to argue for the law’s constitutionality. Indeed, the
Attorney General should support the appointment of amicus in that
situation, as she did in the GNDA Reference. Among other things, this
approach is the best way to make sense of Huscroft’s conclusion that “[t]he
Constitution is best served when the Attorney General ensures that all
relevant arguments – pro and con – are placed before the court.”83
Although under Huscroft’s view the Attorney General fulfills this duty by
arguing for the constitutionality of a challenged law, supporting the
appointment of amicus is another route to a comparable result. Recall also
the ADM’s statement that “[i]t is an important fundamental principle that
a sovereign Parliament that has enacted a law is due its day in court”.84

PART III: FURTHER ANALYSIS
In this part, I explore three deeper questions that appear to be
unasked in the existing literature. First, I consider the legal relevance of
Parliament’s decision to pass a law despite advice from the Attorney
General of Canada that the law is unconstitutional. Then, I consider
whether it is wrongful for Parliament to do so. Finally, I assess whether the
Attorney General should resign when Parliament rejects her advice on
constitutionality.

Question 1: Is Parliament’s Rejection of the Attorney
General’s Advice Legally Relevant?
Recall that the panel at the Quebec Court of Appeal emphasized that
the Act was adopted against the advice of the Attorney General for
Canada.85 Is this a relevant factor in the court’s analysis? As explained
above, the Attorney General for Canada may be Parliament’s lawyer for
the purpose of explaining the legal meaning and effect of proposed
legislation, although that view is contested. It is unclear why or how it is
83
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legally relevant that a client disregarded his lawyer’s advice, and
particularly that Parliament disregarded the Attorney General’s advice.
Perhaps the panel was assuming that Parliament, in disregarding this
advice, was acting recklessly – although, given the legislative debates, such
an assumption would be questionable. Perhaps the panel was assuming
that Parliament should not, or cannot, disregard this advice – or the panel
was privileging the advice of the Attorney General over the advice of an
average lawyer. With respect to the panel, none of these possible
interpretations seem both correct and relevant. The fact that a client
proceeded despite his or her lawyer’s advice is irrelevant to a legal analysis
of that course of action. If Schmidt is correct that the Attorney General is
not a lawyer to the legislature, then Parliament’s rejection of the Attorney
General’s advice is even less relevant.
Parliament, in its narrow and particular lawyer-client relationship with
the Attorney General (if it does indeed have such a relationship), has a
unique disadvantage: the Attorney General’s advice on the meaning and
impact of bills, including their constitutionality, is traditionally made
publicly. Legal advice is subject both to solicitor-client privilege and to the
lawyer’s duty of confidentiality. In most circumstances, it would not only
be irrelevant that a client had rejected her lawyer’s advice, it would be
unknown to the court or to anyone else. The GNDA affair suggests that
perhaps this facet of the Attorney General’s advice to Parliament should in
future be made confidentially, leaving it up to Parliament, not the
Attorney General, to decide whether to make that advice public.

Question 2: Is Parliament’s Rejection of the Attorney
General’s Advice Wrongful?
A deeper question thus arises: Is it wrongful – unlawful or
inappropriate – for Parliament to pass a bill that the Attorney General
advises is unconstitutional? Recall the assertion by Ryder and some
legislators that legislators and Parliament itself have a duty to ensure that
the laws they pass are constitutional86 – but constitutional according to
whom? Huscroft argues that it is up to the legislature, not the Attorney
General, to decide for itself whether a bill is constitutional: the Attorney
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General merely advises, and that advice can be rejected.87 As Huscroft puts
it, “at the end of the day the Attorney General does not have a monopoly
over the correct interpretation of the Charter in the legislative process.”88
More controversially, legislators may support a bill they believe is
unconstitutional – as Robin MacKay puts it, “[w]hile witnesses may testify
that a [private member’s bill] is inconsistent with the Charter, its sponsor
may decide to proceed with it anyway, judging that the political
considerations of the bill outweigh the legal ones.”89 Such an approach is
admittedly troubling, but despite the comments of legislators and
witnesses during the debates, there appears to be no duty – at least, no
enforceable duty – on legislators to ensure that the legislation that they
vote for is constitutional. More charitably, legislators may be willing to
take the risk that a bill is unconstitutional, just as governments often do in
introducing legislation. These comments apply as much to
constitutionality under federalism as to constitutionality under the
Charter. Roach and McAllister would seemingly conclude that the duty
and appropriate role of the Attorney General would be to oppose the
passage of such a bill and then to argue for, or concede, its
unconstitutionality in resultant litigation. It is less clear, however, what
position they would take on the lawfulness or appropriateness of the bill’s
passage itself.
What basis, then, does a legislature need to make the decision that a
bill is constitutional despite the Attorney General’s advice? Perhaps it is
merely good faith – but does good faith in this context require an
objectively reasonable belief or merely a subjective one? The existence of
conflicting opinions or advice cannot in itself mean the bill is
unconstitutional, assuming those opinions and advice are bone fide. Even
in the absence of conflicting opinions, legislators can still in good faith
disagree with the advice of the Attorney General. To demand that
legislative decisions be supported by legal opinions would detract from the
role and responsibility of legislators as argued by Huscroft. Likewise, it
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would be problematic to privilege the views of those legislators who
happen to be lawyers over those legislators who are not.
Again, if Schmidt is correct that the Attorney General is not a lawyer to
the legislature, then Parliament’s rejection of the Attorney General’s
advice is even less relevant.
However, I do note here that if the Attorney General’s advice is to be
given special weight by legislators – and perhaps even special weight by the
courts, as suggested by the panel’s reasons – the Attorney General may
well attract special duties beyond those of a typical lawyer. Not only would
the existing duties of competence and candour be essential, but the
Attorney General in those circumstances would arguably have a special
duty to consider the public interest.90

Question 3: Should the Attorney General Resign When
Parliament Rejects Her Advice?
There is a compelling argument that where Parliament passes a bill
despite the Attorney General’s advice that the bill is unconstitutional, the
Attorney General should resign – or, at least, consider resigning. This
argument, however, is premised on the fact that the Attorney General is
legal advisor to the legislature. The consensus in the literature on the
Attorney General is that where Cabinet proceeds with a bill or other
course of action over the Attorney General’s advice of clear
unconstitutionality, the Attorney General should resign.91 While the
Attorney General is primarily the chief law officer of the Crown, she is
arguably also the lawyer to the legislature for the relatively narrow purpose
of advising on the meaning and effect of bills. Parliament’s rejection of
such advice, as with the GNDA, is a repudiation of the Attorney General
as its lawyer and a declaration of non-confidence in her advice. Indeed,
without addressing resignation specifically, Huscroft analogizes
90
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Parliament’s rejection of the advice of the Attorney General to Cabinet’s
rejection of such advice.92 Moreover, under the rules of professional
conduct, such action by a client – “the client refuses to accept and act
upon the lawyer’s advice on a significant point” – indicates “a serious loss
of confidence between the lawyer and the client” and thus permits
withdrawal by the lawyer.93 While the rules merely permit, and do not
require, withdrawal in these circumstances, it is unclear how the Attorney
General could be effective in this part of her multifaceted role going
forward.94 Since the Attorney General cannot remain the chief law officer
of the Crown without simultaneously being the lawyer to the legislature
for these narrow purposes, resignation seems not only appropriate but
indeed necessary.
If I am wrong, and Schmidt is correct that the Attorney General is not
a lawyer to the legislature, then Parliament’s rejection of the Attorney
General’s advice does not require her resignation.
I have suggested above that, in future, the Attorney General’s advice
that a bill is unconstitutional should perhaps be delivered confidentially,
leaving it to Parliament to decide whether or not to make that advice
public. I have argued elsewhere that there should be a special public
interest exception to privilege and confidentiality when an Attorney
General resigns because Cabinet has rejected her advice that a bill or
course of action is unconstitutional, in order to publicly defend the rule of
law.95 Such an exception should also apply where the Attorney General
resigns because Parliament has rejected her advice that a bill is
unconstitutional.
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A Wrinkle: The Attorney General’s Previous Life as a
Legislator
I also note a peculiar wrinkle in this particular case: David Lametti,
the Attorney General for Canada at the time the Supreme Court of
Canada heard the appeal, had voted for the Act when merely a legislator.
This situation is odd and perhaps even concerning at first glance. His
apparent change in position might suggest that his initial support or later
opposition – or both – were either incorrect or made in bad faith.
However, any lawyer is free to change his opinion when changing clients
or roles and especially in the face of new information. Indeed, the
government itself can and has changed its position midway through
litigation, typically on a change of government. As a legislator, Lametti was
representing his constituents as he saw fit, (representing in the political
not legal sense); as Attorney General, he is now representing in a legal
sense the Government of Canada as chief law officer of the Crown. This
change in roles permits and indeed justifies a change in position.

CONCLUSION
It was appropriate for the Attorney General for Canada to argue
against the federal GNDA in the GNDA Reference. Indeed, her duty to the
rule of law arguably required her to do so. If “Parliament”, i.e. its
deliberative components the House of Commons and Senate, wish such
legislation to be defended, they should retain counsel to do so. With great
respect to Huscroft, his view that the Attorney General owes a duty to the
legislature to defend its legislation was unsupported even before the
decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Schmidt. Even if Schmidt was
incorrect and the Attorney General is the lawyer to the legislature, that is
only with respect to the meaning and impact of bills. In litigation, she has
no duty to the legislature. In contrast to Huscroft’s view, Roach’s view of a
duty to the rule of law is better supported. Nonetheless, Huscroft is quite
right to warn that concessions of unconstitutionality may be abused for
political purposes. Where the Attorney General for Canada will not
defend a federal law (or a provincial Attorney General will not defend a
provincial law), the House or Senate (or the legislative assembly) is free to
do so – and if it does not, the Attorney General should support the
appointment of amicus.
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At the same time, it is completely legitimate, and legally irrelevant in
future litigation, for Parliament to reject the Attorney General’s advice
that a bill is unconstitutional. In doing so, however, it is declaring nonconfidence in the Attorney General as its lawyer. That rejection should
prompt the Attorney General to resign, if indeed she is its lawyer.

